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 This thesis investigates the effects of demographics on modern American electoral 
politics. Despite recent sociological works and media conjecturing, there is little agreement on 
increasing polarization and among what lines the poles have been pulled to. This thesis includes 
data from the 2019 American Community Survey Five Year Estimates in its Ordinary Least 
Squares regression model which accounts for divisions among racial, economic class, and 
geographic differences. Using this data, I find a shifting partisan alignment on educational and 
urban-rural fronts, while racial divides have continued at roughly the same rate as in the past. I 
also find evidence of retrospective economic voting in the 2020 presidential election. These 
findings confirm the theories put forth by sociologists that American politics are becoming more 
polarized than at any point in modern history, and it proposes that the ideological 
homogenization of both the Democratic and Republican parties is to blame. 
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“[The ruling of the 9th Circuit Court] puts us at a competitive disadvantage relative to 
Democrats. Politics is a zero-sum game, and every extra vote they get through unlawful 
interpretations of Section 2 hurts us. It’s the difference between winning an election 50 to 49 and 
losing.” Michael Carvin in Brnovich v. DNC, March 2, 2021 
 
1      Introduction 
On the morning of November 9, 2016, Democrats across the country were shocked to see the 
results displayed on their televisions. Even the most reputable Trump-friendly model, 
FiveThirtyEight’s presidential model, only predicted him with a 30% chance of victory on 
election day (Silver, 2016). While there were systematic polling errors at work that led to the 
surprise after the results were tallied, what carried President Trump across the finish line were 
changes in America’s demographic breakdown over the past fifty years and his ability to harness 
the divisions brought about by those changes (Silver, 2016). 
 As these demographics have shifted, so too have attitudes about them. As sociologist 
Arlie Russell Hochschild notes in her 2015 book Strangers In Their Own Land, 
 “You are patiently standing in a long line for something called the American dream. You 
are white, Christian, of modest means, and getting along in years. You are male. There 
are people of color behind you, and in principle you wish them well. But you’ve waited 
long, worked hard, and the line is barely moving. Then you see people cutting in line 
ahead of you. Who are these interlopers? Some are black, others immigrants, refugees. 
They get affirmative action, sympathy, and welfare--checks for the listless and idle. The 
government wants you to feel sorry for them. The liberal media mocks you as racist or 
homophobic. Everywhere you look, you feel betrayed.” (Hochschild, 2015) 
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While her work focused entirely on the lives of Lousianans, a group often portrayed to be 
inherent populists after the legacy of Huey Long, as early as 2004, history scholar Thomas Frank 
began writing about the fundamental transformation of the state of Kansas, which had previously 
been at the forefront of the far-left movement. Dr. Katherine Cramer detailed the rural versus 
urban conflicts of Wisconsin and the rise of Governor Scott Walker in The Politics of 
Resentment (2016). While many of the prominent works of today document the phenomenon of 
zero-sum politics and the politics of backlash and resentment, they do not offer insight into what 
the fracturing of our society into modern tribes looks like for our electoral politics on a 
quantitative front. 
There is no shortage of prominent figures opining about the death of the American Dream 
or the end of American society as they have known it. This paper aims to put their theories under 
the empirical microscope and see if the anecdotal evidence holds up to the numbers. Fortunately, 
their work paints an identifiable picture: to them, American elections are a zero-sum game. 
When the urbanites win, the rural voters lose. When the white voters win, minority voters lose. 
This is the foundation of zero-sum identity politics: people of different races, educational and 
geographic backgrounds, and socioeconomic statuses sorting into self-identifying groups and 
voting accordingly. 
While identity politics are nothing new to American politics, they have never been able to 
be exploited on the level that they are now. Campaigns have access to census information and 
the characteristics of the voter age population in a way they never have before. Demographic 
information is available down to the precinct and can be exploited to reverse the minimal effects 
hypothesis, or the idea that campaigning only has a limited effect on the actual outcome of an 
election. To that end, there has never been a greater understanding on the sociological and 
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political fronts of voting and the decision to vote and not vote than there is at present. The 
culmination of academic research and ushering in of the new era of “Big Data” have led to an 
unprecedented age which allows campaigns to microtarget—to pick voters apart from their peers 
with new information available from the internet. The election “game” is getting closer to having 
perfect information with every passing day. This begs the question: who plays the game are, how 
is it played, and how does it lead to polarization? 
 
2 Background 
Most scholars would agree that American politics have become increasingly partisan since the 
Republican Revolution of 1994 when Republicans took control of the House of Representatives 
for the first time in forty-one years. While it was once common for the two prominent parties to 
contain a great deal of ideological diversity, the lines have been drawn rather plainly. The 
thought of a conservative Democrat or a liberal Republican today is almost comical. While many 
have been skeptical of the partisan divide and the emergence of polarization after the “de-
alignment” of the second half of the twentieth century, scholarship abounds to the contrary 
(Abramowitz & Saunders, 2005, Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008, Thierault, 2006 among many).  
2.1 Rising Rigidity  
The geographic elasticity among the electorate in whether to choose the Democratic or 
Republican candidate has waned significantly over the past sixty years. From 1960 through 
1976, there were three Democratic victories out of a possible five at the presidential level. Over 
this time, there were 375 counties that never voted for a Democrat, 429 that voted once, 907 that 
voted twice, 779 that voted three times, 420 that voted four times and 89 that voted for the 
Democratic candidate all five times. Democratic performance is shown in Map 1 below. On its 
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own, this may not seem too different, but by modern standards, this is an incredible geographic 




Compared to the Democratic from 1960 to 1976, the three Republican victories from 1980 
through 1996 are much more geographically impressive. From Ronald Reagan’s win in 1980 
through Bill Clinton’s win in 1996, there were three Republican victories. Over this time, 281 
counties voted for the Republican zero times, 234 voted for the Republican once, 484 voted for 
the Republican twice, 459 voted for the Republican three times, 385 voted for the Republican 
four times, and 1,270 voted for the Republican all five times. There was a serious increase in 







From George Bush’s win in 2000 through Donald Trump’s win in 2016, there were three 
Republican victories out of a possible five elections. Over this time, 356 counties voted for the 
Republican zero times, 146 voted for the Republican once, 141 voted for the Republican twice 
times, 145 voted for the Republican three times, 236 voted for the Republican four times, and 
2,089 voted for Republican all five times.  
Number of Times a 






Zero 281 356 -75 
One 234 146 -88 
Two 484 141 -343 
Three 459 145 -314 
Four 385 236 -149 







The elasticity, or the propensity to vote for more than one party, of both counties and states has 
declined significantly in the United States since the presidential election of 1980. In modern 
American politics, this has led to the emergence of pivotal pivot states in close races. While there 
has always been one state that lifts a candidate into victory by crossing the 270 electoral vote 
threshold, this tipping point state has become increasingly important as presidential elections 
have become closer over time. There is a large body of work reflecting on the states which hold 
the most power in the electoral college. Much of this work is flawed in that it cannot hold up to 
the political trends of today. John Wright notes that from 1948 through 1984, the larger states of 
Ohio, California, Illinois, Texas, and New York were the most powerful states in the electoral 
college (Wright, 2009). As he also notes, Gelman, et al. (2004) found that these states hold 
considerably less power today despite still having some of the most electoral votes. As states 
(and the counties that comprise them) have become more inelastic in the past sixty years, the 
states which really hold the power in the electoral college are those which have retained their 
elasticity, or at the very least, their ability to vote for one party or the other.  
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 There are three useful trends from the data presented in Figure 1: 1) regardless of if they 
win the election, Republicans are winning the vast majority of the counties in the United States 
every four years, and this is a new development; 2) presidential elections have gotten 
significantly closer over the last sixty years; and 3) there is a correlation between the number of 





2.2  Hypotheses in Sociology 
This points to a hypothesis proposed by Dr. Katherine Cramer in her book, The Politics of 
Resentment (2016). In a years long study of the politics of Wisconsinites, Cramer finds a sharp 
contrast between those living in rural areas versus those who live in Milwaukee and Madison. 
For those in urban areas, no mind was paid to those in the rural. For those in the rural areas, they 
felt that they were not getting their fair share of attention from their state government. From 
Cramer:  
The sense of identity as people from a place that was disadvantaged economically  
coexisted with the perception that wherever their hard-earned money was going, it was 
not coming to them. It seemed instead to be going, in part, to bloated government 
programs and overpaid and underworked public employees. (pg. 148) 
The rural animosity toward urban areas not only manifested itself in the form of dislike of a large 
government but as a dislike and distrust of government employees and urban residents 
themselves. This suggests a strong understanding of politics by rural Wisconsinites as zero-sum. 
In fact, Cramer writes directly:  
 I draw attention to a kind of politics in which people do not focus their blame on elite  
decision makers as they try to comprehend an economic recession. Instead, they give  
their attention to fellow residents who they think are eating their share of the pie. These  
interpretations are encouraged, perhaps fomented, by political leaders who exploit these  
divisions for political gain. (pg. 6) 
While there appears to be evidence for this at a glance of geopolitical trendlines, it tracks in 
experimental research as well.  
11 
 
 Davidai and Ongis (2019) found that among self-identifying liberals and conservatives, 
there was a significant tendency to view American elections as zero-sum. For liberals, there is a 
tendency to exhibit zero-sum thinking when the status quo is being upheld; for conservatives, 
there is a tendency to exhibit zero-sum thinking when the status quo is being challenged (Davidai 
and Ongis, 2019). This finding lends itself to another hypothesis on polarization proposed by 
sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild. She suggests that there is a relationship between changing 
racial demographics and a propensity to vote for conservative candidates. From her 2016 book 
Strangers in their Own Land:  
 Blacks, women, immigrants, refugees, brown pelicans—all have cut ahead of you in line.  
But it’s people like you who have made this country great. You feel uneasy. It has to be  
said: the line cutters irritate you. They are violating rules of fairness. You resent them,  
and you feel it’s right that you do. So do your friends. Fox commentators reflect your  
feelings, for your deep story is also the Fox News deep story.  
The source of this distrust is easily-diagnosed: for many conservatives, they view the country as 
one where there is an in-crowd of real Americans who made the country great—hard-working 
whites who honored their family’s legacies by taking care of the grounds their ancestors once 
tilled, living in the houses of their forefathers, and being a good neighbor to those around them 
who did the same. Those who did not understand this were outsiders brought to destroy America. 
When they prospered with the aid of the government while not holding the same cultural values, 
it was a crime. As Hochschild notes, the migration patterns into Louisiana (where she studied) 
were not predominantly white.  
 There are other claims about what is causing polarization which have gained traction. 
Economic factors assert themselves into the picture. Frank (2004) characterizes the voting 
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patterns of working-class whites in Kansas as a case-study in how the Republican party had 
taken over the demographic. Bartels (2006) refuted this claim, finding that working-class whites 
had not changed their voting presidential voting patterns, still beholden largely to the Democratic 
party. Similarly, the white working-class (as of 2006) had not become more conservative, and 
economic issues were still more strongly correlated to presidential votes than social issues 
(Bartels, 2006). Gelman, et al. (2010) note that poorer individuals nationwide are more likely to 
vote Democratic while richer individuals are more likely to vote Republican on average. They 
further address the paradox of richer states voting Democratic by noting that in these states, voter 
partisanship is less likely to be stratified by class (Gelman, et al., 2010). Other research has 
found a high correlation between income inequality and party polarization in the United States as 
a whole (Duca & Saving, 2014).  
 Looking at the whole body of work provides many competing narratives on what is truly 
driving polarization in the United States. There are even competing narratives on what has 
brought about this era of hyperpartisanship. What I aim to do is put these narratives to the test by 
regressing multiple variables related to their claims on the county’s choice for the 2016 election.  
 
3  Estimating the Relationship Between Variables of Interest 
As discussed, increasing polarization in American politics has been attributed to income 
inequality (Duca and Saving, 2014), race (Hochschild, 2016), the rural versus urban divide 
(Cramer, 2013), anti-economic interest voting (Frank, 2003), and education by many following 
the 2016 election after the failure by many polls to accurately predict the outcome.  
3.1 Data and Methodology  
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These variables can be put to the test by utilizing an Ordinary Least Squares regression model. I 
attained information by county on population (for rural versus urban comparison), racial 
demographics, median income, Gini coefficient, and education data from the American 
Community Survey Five-Year data estimates for 2019. The central question of polarization is not 
whether it is occurring, but rather, what demographics are being dragged to which poles? Are 
Black voters becoming more polarized toward Democrats over time? Are voters without 
bachelor’s degrees becoming more reliably Republican? To answer these questions, I created a 
county-level regression model measuring several parameters: log(population), Black population 
percentage, Asian population percentage, Hispanic population percentage, log(median income), 
Gini coefficient of a given election year, a binary variable indicating the previous Democrat’s 
win or loss, an interaction term of the Gini coefficient and the binary variable, and the percentage 
of the population that has attained at least a bachelor’s degree. They are all regressed on the 
dependent variable which is the margin between the two candidates in any county measured as 
percent Democrat minus percent Republican. As the R2 value increases, the margin between the 
presidential candidates regressed upon is explained more clearly by the given variables.  
Examining county-level data is not examining individual voting records—places do not vote, 
people do. That said, the following models are presented with caution, meant to be viewed in a 













































































































































































































































































































































































It is clear from the regression that certain coalitions develop around certain candidates. For 
example, in every election from 1960 to 2004, there was significance between the voting patterns 
of counties that voted for the Republican candidate and counties with increased levels of college-
educated voters. Beginning in 2016, this shifted, and these counties began to vote for Democrats 
at a significant and increasing rate. Regression modeling is not without its flaws—you cannot 
control for everything, but one thing is for sure: these measured characteristics explain the 
margins present in each county better now than at any point in time since 1960.  
 
4 Discussion and Analysis 
While the characteristics of these counties did not necessarily cause them to vote at the margins 
they did for candidates over time, they help explain the picture of the coalitions that have 
developed in each party. For example, as the Black percentage of each county increases, all else 
equal, on average, they are more likely to vote for the Democrat running for president. This 
characteristic was less true in the past due to a variety of factors, including but not limited to 
voting rights legislation and partisan elasticity among highly urbanized areas before white flight 
set in.  
4.1 Examining Population Shifts 
County-level data is not optimal in assessing the voting pattern shifts between the rural and 
urban divide, but it is still useful in doing so. There has been a significant change to the 
geographic distribution of the population in the last sixty years with suburbs becoming more 
populated as urban and rural areas have been drained (Mahtta et al., 2019). Still, using the log 
function to measure the population roots out the most rural from the most urban, and there is a 






The story of the population coefficients confirms the rural versus urban divide taking root in 
American elections. There was less evidence for an urban-rural divide prior to 1988 when the 
country’s counties had comparatively massive elasticity handing blowout wins to both 
Democrats and Republicans. Victories were won by Democrats with more rural support than 
they are today. The rural versus urban divide is only deepened by the expansion of suburbs 
which have served to offer not only a physical buffer between the two but an electoral one as 
well. While campaigns in the past won their victories with high-level (or at least, enough) 
support in both rural and urban counties, geographic vote polarization today is higher than at any 
point since 1960. Democrats are winning elections by running up the score in urban areas while 
Republicans are doing the opposite.  






Highly educated places have begun to vote more Democratic on average, all else equal since 
2000. Between 2004 and 2008, Democrats flipped the longstanding educated coalition which had 
been held by Republicans since at least 1960. In 2020, Joe Biden won in these places by an even 
greater margin than any Republican did in the sixty years prior. This lends itself to the more-
educated suburbs of highly urbanized places, and many attribute Joe Biden’s 2020 win to his 
increased margins in these areas. This data is consistent with exit polling and other available 
mediums, such as ANES data. While this shift has been occurring gradually for some time, there 
is still popular skepticism that there will be reversion toward Republicans. While this skepticism 
may be warranted, it can only be because these places voted more Democratic in 2020 than they 
ever voted Republican in the last sixty years. It is possible that there may be a bottoming-out 
effect occurring with college-educated Republican support, and the trend will likely end sooner 
rather than later. 
4.3 Continued Racial Divisions  
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ANES data over time has been consistent in that minority groups have largely voted Democratic 
in presidential elections since the New Deal Coalition. The general trend recently for different 




As the Hispanic population in the United States has increased exponentially since the 1960s, the 
number of counties that they have represented the most votes in has similarly increased (Flores, 
2017). This trend is also similar among Asian Americans (Lopez et al., 2017). Over time, these 
trendlines have become more accurate in reflecting the true voting patterns of non-whites as the 
percent of non-whites has increased by county. Black trends are especially difficult to judge prior 
to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 when voter suppression ran rampant throughout 
majority Black communities in the American South. Their voting patterns are more difficult to 
see prior to and slightly after this period during implementation but stabilize beginning in about 
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1988, as seen in Figure 4. As the Hispanic population has increased in states like California and 
Texas and there are majority-Hispanic counties, this type of county-level modeling is more 
accurate in detailing the way that Hispanic Americans vote at-large. Note the slide in Hispanic 
Democratic support from 2016 to 2020. 
 Democrats were expecting to continue to increase their margins among Hispanic voters 
after the Democratic wave year of 2018 when they overperformed expectations in races like the 
2018 Texas Senate race when Democrat Beto O’Rourke nearly defeated incumbent Republican 
Ted Cruz. Though they were not able to increase their margins, Hispanic places overall 
continued to overwhelmingly vote for Joe Biden. The greatest problems for Democrats arose in 
places like the Rio Grande Valley and Miami-Dade County, but they remain hopeful for the 
future there (Inskeep, 2021).  
4.4 Economic Stratification 
Figure 5 
 
Though Democrats may have held the edge in wealthier counties in 1960, this peaked in Lyndon 
Johnson’s 1964 landslide victory before steadily falling off, and they lost this coalition in 1972. 
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Despite still not gaining it back as of 2020, there has been a significant trend since 1988 in 
Democrats’ direction. Wealthier counties voted at a higher rate for Joe Biden in 2020 than they 
have at any point since George McGovern’s campaign in 1972. There is a clear trend in 
Democrats’ direction in this direction, and at this moment, this indicates a decline in class-based 
voting among places. 
In 2014, Duca and Saving found a significant correlation between income inequality and 
propensity to vote Democratic. This finding can be thought of as linking urban areas with high 
poverty to also have wealthy residents. Though they used an inverse Pareto-Lorenz curve, and I 
used the Gini coefficient, we produced the same results over the studied time period. After their 
study, this trend swung back toward zero, and the correlation between the Gini coefficient and 
the margin between the vote shares of both parties has been insignificant at the county level since 
2016. Similarly, Duca and Saving (2014) also noted that income inequality was a more 
pronounced effect in places where Democrats win. To test this, I included an interaction term 
between a binary variable indicating if Hillary Clinton won the county in 2016 and the Gini 
coefficient. While this effect was significant from 2008 through 2016, its coefficient has declined 
over this period and by 2020 it was only significant to the 5% level, indicating a drop off in its 
effect.  
At the same time, income may still be a good predictor of election results at the county 
level, albeit through a different lens. Economic prosperity paired with retrospective voting 
hypotheses have accurately predicted elections for over the past sixty years (Erikson, 1989 and 
Kahane, 2008). Is it perhaps possible that the economic gains or losses of groups have caused 









The case for Democrats had been building that 2020 was going to be a continued year of 
gains with not only heavily Hispanic places but majority-minority locales in general. When they 
were disappointed as the results came back from Florida and Texas, many questioned what the 
problem was. Did the Trump campaign do more outreach to Hispanic voters? Was Biden a weak 
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candidate to turn out Hispanic voters? The answer might be simpler than that. Consider the idea 
of retrospective economic voting. Rather than look at median income generally, consider it 
through the lens of zero-sum politics. The following regression runs the same variables of 
interest as the previous except it factors in gains in income relative to the whole nation from 
2017 to 2019 obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This is done instead than Gini 
coefficient data, as it was rendered insignificant in recent elections. For reference, consider the 
data presented in Map 4 and Map 5. 
 





























































R2 0.732 0.587 
Table 4 
 While the R2 values likely decline so much from one model to the other due to the static 
caught by the removed terms, there is a significant effect on relative income gained or lost 
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compared to the rest of country in the voting patterns of states. While this trend does not explain 
the data in places like California, Oregon, and Washington, it may be the key to unlocking why 
Trump made inroads with Hispanic voters in the Rio Grande Valley and Miami-Dade County: 
perhaps Trump’s policies and rhetoric toward Mexico mattered less when voting compared to 
their relative economic prosperity. There are signs of retrospective voting regarding economic 
gains, but it is unclear why these did not persist in other parts of the country.  
 
5 Discussion 
Upon review of the increasing coefficient values and increasing values of their significance, I 
find there is a clear correlation of rural versus urban voting, college-educated versus non-college-
educated, and racial voting. There are clear patterns which have established themselves firmly in 
American politics over the last twenty years regarding partisan voting. While there are likely 
many reasons why this has happened, I will discuss three which I believe to be the most 
important: ideologically homogenous parties, decline in social capital, and the strategic decisions 
by both major parties beholden not to values but electoral advantage. 
5.1 Ideologically Homogenous Parties  
First, the intraparty ideological cohesion plays a major role in the voting patterns of the 
electorate. Though not discussed heavily in this paper, there has been a significant decline in 
split-ticket voting (Desilver, 2016). Throughout much of the 20th century, there was a broad 
coalition of Democrats, namely in the South who opposed the advancement of Civil Rights and 
were rather conservative. Comparatively, though not as prominent, were a large coalition of 
liberal Republicans located throughout the Northeast. Some, like Charlie Baker and Phil Scott, 
persist today and are quite popular among their constituencies, winning statewide races in 
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typically Democratic states. Parties with wider ideological spectrums not only caused more 
bipartisanship, but it caused a greater elasticity in the electorate. The composition of each party 
played more of a role in this than did any ideological shifts of the electorate. 
 Furthermore, there is no indication that the electorate has become any more conservative 
or liberal in the past 60 years. It has merely become easier for voters to identify and choose the 
candidates that align with their values because of the increasing polarization (Abramowitz & 
Saunders, 1996). Part of the reason that this polarization has taken so long to manifest itself is 
the lagging desire of voters to change their party preferences despite the ideological changes of 
the party. Voters are more apt to vote for candidates bearing their partisan label until they realize 
that their ideological interests may be better represented by voting for another candidate. On the 
macro level, that lags the ideological changes of politicians themselves. In other words, this 
process takes time. 
Applying social choice theory aids in understanding how the lines are drawn. Consider 
this realistic scenario: there are 100 Senators, each with a unique ideological preference drawn 
on a scale of liberal to conservative. Each Senator votes to accept or reject legislation on the 
basis of how well it aligns with his or her goals formed on an ideological basis. The choice is 
binary. When forced to vote on a liberal issue, a liberal Senator will gain some form of discrete 
utility by voting in favor. Similarly, when forced to vote on a conservative issue, a conservative 







In the two games presented by the payoff matrices in Figure 6, the choice is clear, and each side 
has a dominant strategy. The game played between both parties is identical. This is the definition 
of zero-sum: when Democrats win, Republicans lose and vice versa. This game has had 
interesting effects in actual halls of the Capitol building. 
Trying to effectively govern from the minority, senatorial “gangs” remove the median 
voter from the control of either party. If either party is in power with a comfortable margin, there 
is no reason for these collectives to spring up. With a majority, each party has their own 
dominant strategy—to rule with an iron fist. 
 While it would appear this partisan divide is contrary to legislative progress, different 
groups have popped up over time to avoid gridlock. In the mid-2000s, the “Gang of Fourteen,” 
consisting of nearly every congressional ideology, formed in the Senate to stop the filibustering 
of President Bush’s judicial appointees (Rudin, 2006) including former presidential candidate 
John McCain, who cemented his legacy as a maverick in the 2000 election, bucking his party at 
every turn. There have been smaller bipartisan groups since then including the debt-focused 
“Gang of Eight” in 2011 (Calmes, 2011) and the separate immigration-focused “Gang of Eight” 
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in 2013 (Halloran, 2013). Although these groups show a break from the partisan normalcy, they 
are exactly that: a break. They are the exception and not the rule.  
 In addition to these gangs, there are similar bipartisan groups in the House of 
Representatives. The bipartisan Problem Solvers Caucus has proven to be an effective cluster of 
legislators, albeit it has faced some criticism from its former members (Pocan, 2018). Despite 
being effective on some issues, one of the caucus’s premier goals was to stand in opposition of 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s agenda, and it is safe to say that they have ardently failed to do so. Since 
2018, she has successfully led two presidential impeachments as well as the passage of the 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act. Additionally, despite a caucus of 
56, which would easily be enough to keep her from becoming the Speaker of the House, they 
have failed in doing so. While these bipartisan alliances form, they often fail to meet their goals 
for one reason: it is in no one’s best interest.  
 This is the foundation upon which polarization is built. With ideologically homogenous 
parties, there is an incentive to govern mercilessly. Bipartisanship is a rarity because there is no 
individual incentive to deviate from the dominant strategy. In fact, such deviation is harmful in 
achieving the goals of the group.  
 When the parties were ideologically heterogenous, bipartisanship was more common 
because legislators from different parties had similar goals. Party loyalty was not held together 
by the ideological bonds that it is today. For example, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
infamously tried to oust conservative members of the Democratic party in the midterm elections 
of 1938. Dubbed “Roosevelt’s Purge” by many journalists, he embarked on a tour across the 
South to campaign for more liberal replacements so he could enact even more liberal policies. 
Instead of replacing conservatives, Roosevelt found even more of them in Congress in 1939—89 
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new Republicans in Congress. Only one of the Democrats he opposed (John O’Connor, NY-16) 
was successfully defeated for a more liberal replacement. The animosity between ideologies has 
always existed: their alignment within the parties has not. 
5.2  Partisanship and Obstructionism 
Perhaps the most misused word in modern discourse, polarization must be used to describe the 
downfall of bipartisanship. If the cooperation between members of either party was bipartisan, 
polarization is the growing absence of that cooperation. It is an unbroken and unbridled 
dichotomy which can often be described as hostile. Partisan behavior is not limited to members 
of Congress. Anyone who finds themselves in a position with a dominant strategy in their vote 
has no incentive to deviate. This manifests itself at every stage of government. The ways in 
which parties rule mercilessly are bound by nothing except existing laws themselves.  
 One of the most common ways that partisanship is affected is through obstructionism. 
While it can take many forms in American government, no legislative body has defined 
obstructionism better in the past decade than the United States Senate. In 2009, the Republican 
minority enacted the filibuster more than it was in the entire 1950s decade (Skocpol and Jacobs, 
2012). Another example of recent obstructionism could include the refusal by Republican 
majorities to take steps necessary to enact liberal priorities. For example, in 2010, a law was 
passed in response to the financial collapse of 2008 which established the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau. For this bureau to function, the Senate needed to vote to confirm President 
Obama’s nominee. The Republican minority threatened to filibuster this vote until legislation 
was passed that fundamentally changed the agency because they opposed its existence. This did 
not end until President Obama made a recess appointment (Skocpol & Jacobs, 2012). 
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 Further examples of this polarizing tactic include then Senate Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell refusing to hold votes on President Obama’s judicial appointees. During the last two 
years of his term, only 28.6% of Obama’s judicial nominees were confirmed (McMillion, 2019). 
This included a contentious battle to replace conservative justice Antonin Scalia, who died in 
February 2016. McConnell at the time was quoted saying, “It is a president's constitutional right 
to nominate a Supreme Court justice, and it is the Senate's constitutional right to act as a check 
on a president and withhold its consent… This nomination should not be filled, this vacancy 
should not be filled by this lame duck president.” Four years later, after the passing of Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg in September 2020, McConnell held a vote to confirm Justice Amy Coney 
Barrett to the Supreme Court just eight days before the presidential election. Prior to 2016, there 
were two election year Supreme Court appointments made during modern periods of divided 
government: in 1988 with Justice Kennedy and the 1956 appointment of Justice Brennan 
(Wheeler, 2020). There was no precedent to withhold a vote on the nomination of Merrick 
Garland in 2016, but there was a precedent set in 2016 to withhold a vote on the nomination of 
Amy Coney Barrett (set in 2016). Obstructionist behavior is beholden to no norms or precedent, 
only partisanship. This is polarization manifested at the highest level of government. 
5.3  New Coalitions and Party Strategy 
In contrast, there are some coalitions that are changing over time. For example, as the 
Republican party has leaned further into the “culture war” aspect (Lemire and Colvin, 2021) of 
their ambitions, there has been an overwhelming rejection by educated voters. It is not a 
coincidence that educated voters have swung toward the Democratic presidential candidate in 
every election since 2000. There has been a rejection of the cultural conservatism presented by 
the modern Republican party by educated voters. It is also not coincidental that the remaining 
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liberal Republicans are present in highly educated Northeastern states like Vermont and 
Massachusetts. The realignment of educated voters is prominent, not accidental, and will 
continue without reversion until there is a change in party strategies.  
 Another significant factor in determining the outcome of elections is the strategy of the 
two major parties. While it is a long held and well documented phenomenon that campaigns 
themselves have a limited effect on outcomes (Cambell, 2001, Finkel, 1993, and Lazarfeld et al., 
1988), it holds logically that the parties themselves dictate which voters actually fill the ballot 
box and which voters stay home (Aldrich, 1993). Consequently, it follows that each party 
decides which voters to target in their campaign strategies from the beginning. It is a calculated 
decision that Republicans have leaned into the culture war aspect of politics. This strategy is 
popular among less educated voters who usually tend to be more rural. If they believe the 
national environment to be more favorable to them, by embracing this strategy, they can win 
states like Ohio where uneducated voters outnumber educated voters. This math also works in 
their favor in places like Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania—all states that handed the 
presidency to Donald Trump in 2016 despite their Democratic history. Republicans properly 
strategized the geographic spread of their voters for the electoral college. American presidential 
elections have been increasingly won at the margins, and the parties have caused this.  
 In any given year, the electorate is favorable to one party or the other, usually due to their 
retrospective nature. Each party plays a balancing game in gaining new voters against losing old 
voters because of the environmental shifts from the last election. In 2016, Donald Trump was 
able to corner many white rural voters. He effectively brought many working-class whites into 
the Republican coalition through a message of economic populism. These voters turned out in 
even larger numbers in 2020, and Joe Biden was able to win by improving his margins with 
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suburban, more educated voters. Because of the hemorrhaging of the suburbs, the geographic 
math was no longer in Donald Trump’s favor in 2020.  
 In this suburban loss, the forty-fifth president gained white working-class voters. This is 
in sharp contrast to minority working class voters who continued to vote Democratic. As part of 
this, it is clear from the regression in Table 3 that there has been a decline in class voting since 
2012. In counties with a higher median income, the general trend has progressed in favor of 
Democrats since 1988. I find that the Gini coefficient, which Duca and Saving (2014) found to 
be significant in 2014 in affecting polarization, to be insignificant and decreasing in its ability to 
explain electoral outcomes at the county level. While still a significant factor, this is also the case 
in places where Democrats win, a reliable trait beginning in 1972. This is a clear indicator of a 
shift away from voting based on economic class in recent elections.  
 To examine the way that economics factor into the way that people are voting, the story 
may be the same as it always has been. Places which experienced higher levels of growth 
significantly increased their swing toward Trump in 2020 relative to 2016. This lends itself to 
zero-sum voting preferences. While most of the United States saw economic growth from 2017 
to 2019, it was the places which saw the least growth who voted statistically significantly less for 
Trump on average, all else equal.  
Political psychologists have depicted the downfall of social trust as an indicator of 
polarization and the fracturing of the American public into the demographic groups that define it 
today. If better data were available regarding the intricacies of each race, the regressions would 
likely yield an even higher degree of accuracy. This explanation makes sense: when Americans 
do not trust one another and feel like the out-group is swindling them, they are more likely to 
view politics as zero-sum. The emergence of homogenous parties lends itself to this. American 
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politics today has become a simple model with less nuance than existed previously: voters self-
identify into tribalist groups and vote accordingly. It is the emergence of identity politics at the 
highest level which has played well into the hands of parties. By entering into demographic 
groups, the parties can leverage those identities against other identities. 
 The success of the Trump campaign in courting Latino voters was crucial in its 2020 
successes in Florida and Texas. The former president improved on his margins in crucial Latino 
majority places like Miami-Dade County and the Rio Grande Valley which prevented the states 
from swinging across the aisle to helping elect Joe Biden. As much as voters must choose their 
candidates, the parties play a role in choosing their voters through coalition building. This is 
where the role of the parties is most prominent; they must choose the groups that will be most 
excited by their candidate and in turn must not alienate enough of the old base into staying home 
or voting for the other candidate according to spatial theory.  
5.4 The New Calculus of Voting 
When Riker and Ordeshook (1968) first defined their model of the rational calculus of voting as 
R = (BP) – C + D, it was earthshattering to model decision-making in this way in political 
science. From left to right, the reward of voting must equal the projected benefits multiplied by 
the probability that the vote cast makes a difference minus the cost of voting plus the sense of 
civic duty to vote. The time this was written was at the peak of split-ticket voting during 
Democrats’ incredible run of House control for fifty-six out of sixty years. It was written at a 
time when Lyndon Johnson carried 73% of the counties in the country, enacted the some of the 
most liberal legislation the country had ever seen, and in the same year, conservative Richard 
Nixon would blowout Hubert Humphrey and win 78% of the counties in the country. For the 
voter described by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), the choice to vote was less determined by zip 
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code or rural/urban status and more closely tied to other factors like class and educational 
attainment, but at the same time, these effects were still not as pronounced as they are in today’s 
elections. In a polarized world, the calculus of voting must be modified:  
 In-Group Reward = (BP) – C + D    or     Out-Group Detriment = (BP) – C + D 
Whereas Riker and Ordeshook (1968) looked at the calculus of voting as an individual decision, 
zero-sum voting requires an approach like war. There can only be one winner in any decision 
made. Voters must ask themselves: am I a rural voter? am I a white voter? am I a union voter? 
am I an educated voter? These questions more often than not have led to the current state of 
affairs. On the other side, if I do not vote, will we lose the election to Hispanics, who are 
prospering economically relative to us? Will those darned city folks get their way and leave us 
out to dry? Will the coastal elites leave us out on the line again? These are the questions that led 
the Rust Belt to vote for Donald Trump in 2016.  
 Social psychologist Henri Tajfel (1970) wrote that in-groups which discriminated against 
out-groups often did so in the same ways as other in-groups did. This discrimination differed in 
who it targeted, but it did not differ in the ways in which is used to form a group identity to rally 
around. In a similar way, it is the intersectional identities of voters which are pooled together into 
the two parties as identifiers and used to persuade voters of which side they are on. It is merely 
the sides which are shifting, or realigning, at this moment along geographic, racial, and 
educational lines instead of the class-based voting patterns of the past.  
 It is the intersectional identities of voters which manifest themselves in ways that are hard 
to measure. For example, our current regression modeling would not be well-equipped to handle 
well-educated rural voters or Black rural voters. These are the voters that slip through the cracks 
in these types of analyses, and in a country where presidential elections are increasingly decided 
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on the margins, this is the type of certainty which must be baked into proper, nuanced election 
modeling. While they may be fringe compared to the majority, they play a role as important role 
in American elections as easily definable voting blocs.  
 As the parties have respectfully taken risks in becoming ideologically homogenous, they 
have also taken risks in defining themselves along these group identities. There is no example 
where this is clearer than among the white working-class voters that Trump captured in 2016 
who left the modern Democratic party for the first time. With Hillary Clinton choosing to align 
more strongly with minority candidates and spend time outside of the Rust Belt, the Republican 
party made a political decision to capture these voters by playing into economic and racial 
anxieties (Kreutz, 2016). By investing resources into these states, there was a clear play which 
drew out white working-class voters in the former Blue Wall. The relative prosperity in other 
areas drew out these voters. In the calculus of voting, the Republican Party was not only able to 
raise the individual reward by promising a future that resembled the past (“Make America Great 
Again”), but they were able to capitalize on out-group detriment with slogans like “We’re going 
to build the wall, and Mexico’s going to pay for it” and "We can’t continue to allow China to 
rape our country, and that’s what they’re doing.” By singling out these groups, they were able to 
pull out the “whiteness” of the white working-class which caused them to vote Republican rather 
than Democrat, in contrast to their economic interests.  
5.5 How Parties Pick Their Coalitions 
Despite being ideologically homogenous, there are still salient issues which the parties flip-flop 
on. One example of this is broad healthcare reform. In just the last thirty years, there was a 
bipartisan consensus (Clymer et al., 1994) on national reform before it was pronounced dead on 
arrival in the Senate before the Republican-wave election of 1994. Make no mistake, it was not 
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turned down because it was truly unpopular among Republican Senators—it was turned down to 
make the president and his party look bad (Starr, 1994). It was a moment of political opportunity 
to seal the deal for Republicans to make Clinton look like a weak leader going into an election 
where they thought they had a chance to take back the House of Representatives for the first time 
in over thirty years due to the declining heterogeneity of the parties.  
 In her book, Boomerang: Healthcare Reform and the Turn Against Government (1997), 
Theda Skocpol details how the Clinton healthcare plan was crafted in a bipartisan matter, 
designed to be appealing to both sides, was nationally popular, and had bipartisan support 
because of the problems it solved. This was the case until Republican strategists saw it as an 
opportunity. While it may sound cynical, this bill was the perfect opportunity to take out the 
Democratic majority in Washington, and in 1994, they succeeded.  
 Another example in the world of healthcare reform is that of the individual mandate. The 
individual mandate was originally proposed by the conservative think-tank Heritage Foundation 
in 1989 and introduced in Congress in 1993 by Orrin Hatch and Chuck Grassley among others as 
part of the Clinton healthcare reform movement (History of the Individual Health Insurance 
Mandate, 2012). With healthcare measures defeated in the 1990s, it was re-introduced in 2007 as 
a bipartisan bill led by Oregon Democrat Ron Wyden. It was even a sticking point during the 
2008 Democratic primary: Barack Obama was opposed to it—Hillary Clinton was for it. When 
Obama’s Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act passed in 2010 with no Republican support, 
the individual mandate was in. When something is politically expedient, either side will adopt it 





I find a significant, strong correlation within the realignment across all tested demographic 
groups, as well as across the rural and urban divide. I also find a significant decrease in class-
based voting, as Democrats have cornered poorer urban votes while Republican have cornered 
poorer rural votes. Further, I find significant evidence to support retroactive economic-based 
voting hypotheses in the wake of the 2020 election, as places which did better economically from 
2017 to 2019 voted for Donald Trump at a significantly higher rate than places which did not.  
 I suggest these shifts toward realignment and partisan polarization are not a choice of the 
electorate but rather a choice of the parties to move toward homogeneity among their elected and 
vocal membership. This is because both parties found it to be politically opportunistic to do so, 
just as they find other things politically opportunistic and capitalize on them accordingly such as 
their stances on healthcare reform and Supreme Court appointments. This polarization also takes 
place at a time when social trust has fallen precipitously in the United States, and the zero-sum 
nature of polarized politics lends itself rather well to that idea, though it is impossible to 
statistically test its origins, as their interactions with one another may be ouroboric. 
I also note the findings of this thesis, while supported from its OLS regression, are 
incomplete due to the geographic nature of the modeling and must be cross-checked with 
individual attitudes found both qualitatively and quantitatively with studies to improve its 
validity and work toward a better understanding of the new political alignment, which is still 
developing. It should be viewed in a Bayesian manner, as part of a larger whole in the 
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